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  Testing Creditor Moral Hazard in Sovereign Bond Markets: 






This paper critically evaluates the existing empirical literature on creditor moral hazard in 
sovereign bond markets, proposes a unified theoretical approach to test for IMF-induced 
creditor moral hazard, and provides empirical evidence, using daily sovereign bond 
market spreads of Indonesia and Korea. The results suggest that IMF-related news 
regarding program negotiations and approval may be associated with creditor moral 
hazard, but their impact on spreads is short-lived, indicating that creditor moral hazard 

















1.  Introduction  
Creditor moral hazard is the hypothesis that an expected IMF support to a country 
may provide an implicit guarantee to its creditors regarding their returns, which motivates 
investors to take excessive risks (Edwards, 1998; Eichengreen, 2000; Feldstein, 1998; 
Schultz  et al., 1998; Schwartz, 1998). The IMF support to Mexico in 1995, which 
preceded financial crises in South East Asia (1997), Russia (1998), and Brazil (1998), has 
led to the contention that IMF funds to a crisis country cause creditor moral hazard in 
financial markets. For example, Friedman (1998) argued that the IMF’s support to 
Mexico “… encouraged individuals and financial institutions to lend to and invest in the 
East Asian countries, drawn by high domestic interest rates and returns on investment, 
and reassured about currency risk by the belief that the IMF would bail them out if the 
unexpected happened and the exchange pegs broke.”  
  Following initial empirical studies concerning creditor moral hazard that emerged 
in the late 1990s, the interest in quantifying this type of moral hazard has been raising 
since then. The motivation for our work on creditor moral hazard in sovereign bond 
markets is based on the several observations about the existing literature. First, all related 
empirical studies employ the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI), which 
overwhelmingly represents the Latin American debt. One may question the validity of 
using the EMBI to find for creditor moral hazard for non-Latin countries, due to its 
specific focus. Second, previous studies utilize a time period of more than one year for 
IMF program variables to capture creditor moral hazard effects. This seems to be a fairly 
long time for creditor moral hazard to last, especially given the highly-reversible nature 
of international portfolio flows, as reported in Sarno and Taylor (1999).  Indeed, the 
results in this paper suggest that creditor moral hazard may last only for a very short time. 
Third, even though understanding investor behavior towards IMF-related news is of 
critical importance to make correct inferences about creditor moral hazard, this question 
has not received much attention in the literature. Finally, previous studies use OLS  
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estimations of daily bond spreads, which assumes constant variance of spreads. If  bond 
spreads exhibit time-varying volatility, OLS estimates may lead to biased inferences.  
  Motivated by these observations, this paper assesses whether previous work has 
adequately tested the creditor moral hazard hypothesis, discusses the nature of creditor 
moral hazard and difficulties associated with its measurement, offers a unified theoretical 
approach to test for  creditor moral hazard in sovereign bond markets, and provides 
empirical evidence from daily Indonesian and Korean bond spreads.  
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares and evaluates the methods 
and the results of previous empirical studies on creditor moral hazard in bond markets. 
Section 3 establishes a new framework for testing creditor moral hazard in bond markets. 
Section 4 summarizes the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 5 provides 
concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.  
 
2. Review of Existing Literature on Creditor Moral Hazard in Bond Markets 
Table 1 provides an overview of existing empirical studies on creditor moral 
hazard by Sarno & Taylor (1999), Kamin & Kleist (1999), Zhang (1999), Lane & Phillips 
(2000), Tillmann (2001), and Dell’Ariccia, Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer (2002).  
There is a fundamental difference between the approach adopted by Sarno and 
Taylor (1999) and other contributors. While most empirical studies examine the changes 
in spreads, Sarno and Taylor (1999) represent the most comprehensive empirical paper 
on creditor moral hazard in that they examine the time series properties of various 
financial flows (portfolio, commercial bank, official, and foreign direct investment, FDI, 
flows) to emerging markets. They argue that the knowledge about these properties would 
enhance one’s predictive ability as to which types of flows are likely to be reversed. Their 
results indicate that official flows tend to have a large, statistically significant permanent 
component. Regarding private flows, FDI and commercial bank credits to East Asia have 
a large permanent component and therefore are highly irreversible, while  portfolio flows 
to most Asian countries have a large temporary component. Such high degree of portfolio 
flow reversibility, among other findings, persuades Sarno and Taylor (1999) to conclude 
that their results regarding portfolio flows are consistent with the moral hazard 
interpretation of the East Asian crisis.    
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Other empirical studies of creditor moral hazard examine changes in spreads on 
emerging market bonds. Even though there is a significant body of literature on the 
determinants of spreads on emerging market bonds, only a few studies directly relate 
changes in spreads to moral hazard.
1 The following studies examine the changes in 
spreads before, during, and after the currency crises of the 1990s. It is generally assumed 
that declining yield spreads may imply creditor moral hazard. 
Kamin and Kleist (1999) show that the fundamental relationship between the 
credit rating of selected emerging countries and spreads on their bonds was intact during 
the Mexican crisis. The coefficient of the interaction term between the Mexico dummy 
and the credit rating variable is found statistically significant, indicating that lower 
creditworthiness was associated with higher spreads during the Mexican crisis. Kamin 
and Kleist (1999) also show that spreads are lower after the Mexican crisis.
2 However, 
they attribute this result to the overall improvement of emerging markets’ fundamentals 
following the crisis, and not to moral hazard.
3 
Zhang (1999) focuses on Eurobonds and Brady bonds spreads and reports higher  
spreads during the Mexican crisis, which is consistent with the finding in Kamin and 
Kleist (1999).
4 Zhang (1999) argues that his finding of a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on U.S. high-yield bond spreads does not only provide support for 
the capital market segmentation hypothesis, but also reinforces the above result regarding 
the absence of creditor moral hazard in bond markets. He argues that, if there were 
creditor moral hazard due to the financial support provided to Mexico, funds would have 
been taken away from U.S. high-yield bonds towards emerging market bonds, which 
would have produced a negative coefficient.     
  Our approach is closely related to that of Lane and Phillips (2000). They adopt a 
news-based approach to observe the effects of IMF-related news on spreads, using the 
EMBI.
5  They conclude that news regarding the Fund’s support to Mexico, Thailand, 
Indonesia, South Korea, and Russia generally increased yield spreads on emerging 
country debt, which is not consistent with creditor moral hazard. Additionally, they point 
out that IMF-packages are not large enough to provide guarantees for the majority of 
investors.        
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Tillmann (2001) estimates spreads by means of a GARCH-in-the-mean (GARCH-
M) model, and finds that investors of emerging market bonds charge a higher risk 
premium when the degree of market uncertainty rises. Therefore, creditor moral hazard 
changes the risk-return relationship by decreasing the unit price of perceived risk. 
Tillmann’s (2001) results show that, in one specification, the coefficient of the crisis 
dummy has the sign that is consistent with creditor moral hazard, but it statistically 
insignificant.  
Dell’Ariccia, Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer (2002) argue that the recent Russian 
crisis is much better suited to test the impact of changing bailout expectations on spreads 
than the 1995 Mexican bailout, because it represents a highly unanticipated non-bailout 
event. They find that the Russian crisis was followed by a permanent and significant 
increase in spreads, indicating that the Russian non-bailout increased the perceived risk 
of emerging market debt. Their results suggest that spreads became more responsive to 
country ratings after the Russian crisis, which is not consistent with the creditor moral 
hazard hypothesis.     
Finally, Kamin (2002) shows that both the Mexican and Russian crises led to 
statistically significantly higher spreads. Kamin (2002) recognizes that spreads are 
affected by both supply and demand conditions and it is difficult to attribute changes in 
spreads to either condition. He adds that his results regarding capital flows to emerging 
market economies are consistent with the changes in relevant countries’ fundamentals, 
indicating no creditor moral hazard. 
Evaluation of the Existing Literature  
The literature review suggests that, except for Sarno & Taylor (1999), other 
studies find no creditor moral hazard effects in bond markets. In addition, the procedures 
of Sarno and Taylor (1999) do not directly measure creditor moral hazard. They simply 
show which types of flows are more likely to be associated with creditor moral hazard. 
One can therefore argue that the accumulated empirical evidence so far does not provide 
significant support for creditor moral hazard in bond markets.   
Previous results may be sensitive the type of data and news used, as well as the 
treatment of investor behavior. With respect to the type of data, all earlier studies, with 
the exception of Sarno and Taylor (1999), use some variation of the EMBI. Latin  
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America’s debt instruments, especially Brady bonds, have an overwhelming weight in the 
EMBI. Both Figure 1 and Table 2 show the strong representation of the Latin American 
debt in the EMBI. Even though between April 1991 and October 2001 non-Latin debt 
increased its share from zero to almost 33 percent, the EMBI is still influenced by the 
Latin American debt. Additionally, Figure 1 indicates that the EMBI was heavily 
influenced by the Latin American debt during the mid- and late-1990s, which are the 
years of interest in this paper. The problem with choosing the EMBI spreads is that the 
changes in spreads may not contain information regarding creditor moral hazard with 
respect to non-Latin American countries. We think that using country-specific data is 
more useful for correct inferences.   
  Regarding the use of IMF program dummies in regressions to make inferences 
about creditor moral hazard, there are three significant issues. The first one is related to 
the duration of the crisis dummy. In studies by Zhang (1999), Kamin and Kleist (1999), 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002), and Kamin (2002), this variable covers the entire IMF program 
period. It is questionable whether creditor moral hazard would last as long time as a 
couple of years. We believe that creditor moral hazard should last for a shorter time due 
to the highly reversibility of equity flows.  Indeed, Hayo and Kutan (2003) report that the 
effects of IMF-related news are neutralized in stock, bond, and foreign exchange markets 
within one day after the announcement. Clearly, one should choose a shorter horizon for 
testing creditor moral hazard in these markets. It is possible that creditor moral hazard 
may not be present when a longer horizon is used. 
  The second issue the selection of most relevant IMF-related news for moral 
hazard tests. Because of the highly reversible nature of portfolio investment, we argue 
that, besides program implementation, investors would pay attention to information 
contained in news such as start of IMF program negotiations or a final program approval, 
showing the amount of expected Fund supports over time.  
Third, because of the sequential nature of the 1990s currency crises, some 
economists have suggested the presence of sequential moral hazard. According to this 
view, an IMF support in country A may motivate investors to purchase country B’s bonds 
and equities, if country B is expected to receive an IMF program in the near future as 
well (Edwards, 1998; Eichengreen, 2000; Feldstein, 1998; Friedman, 1998; Schultz et al.,  
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1998; Schwartz, 1998). Therefore, when testing for creditor moral hazard in a program 
country, besides IMF news in this country, news in other prospective countries should 
also be included in estimations to control for sequential moral hazard effects. Otherwise, 
inferences may be biased if other country news affects local equity returns. 
  Finally, investor behavior is not discussed thoroughly in previous studies. 
Creditor moral hazard is driven by investor behavior because it implies that investors 
undertake excessive risks, based on their expectation of an IMF program in a given 
country. Therefore, the process during which investors may decide to take such excessive 
risks during IMF programs should be explicitly described.  
  Our theoretical approach in this paper is based on a unified framework in that it 
addresses all the key issues summarized above: highly reversible nature of portfolio flows 
(Sarno and Taylor, 1999), spread determination (Kamin & Kleist, 1999; Zhang, 1999; 
Tillmann, 2001; Dell’Ariccia, Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer, 2002), a news approach (Lane 
& Phillips 2000), and Friedman’s (1998) focus on investor behavior. In addition, we pay 
close attention to time series properties of bond spreads in estimations. While all previous 
studies, except for Tillmann (2001), employ OLS estimates of bond spreads, we also use 
the maximum likelihood GARCH models to account for time-varying volatility in bond 
spreads.  
 
3.  A Unified Framework  
  In this section, we model investor behavior. We like to answer the question of  
why investors would decide to hold more of a country’s financial instruments in the 
presence of a prospective IMF program in that country. Noting the fact that emerging 
markets issue high-risk, high-return bonds, we expect that investors would include more 
of these instruments, if IMF programs would signal implicit guarantees on their (high) 
returns. The nature of the implicit guarantees with respect to portfolio flows depends 
upon the type of financial flows.
6 When sovereign bonds are considered, it can be argued 
that defaulting on its sovereign bonds would be damaging to a country’s 
creditworthiness. Especially when the country is currently under an IMF program and 
trying to signal improvement, stability, and credibility, it would be less willing to default 
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on its sovereign bonds. Additionally, there is the issue of the currency denomination of 
the financial instrument, based on which the nature of the implicit guarantee would 
change. Instruments denominated in domestic currencies are subject to exchange rate 
risk, which requires the explanation of investors’ expectations regarding the effect of 
IMF programs on the exchange rate.
7 In this paper, we focus on dollar-denominated 
sovereign bonds, as the majority of the existing literature does.            
Now, we turn our attention to the characteristics of investors. There is a wide 
variety of assumptions regarding investor behavior: rational behavior, limited rational 
behavior, noise traders, contagion, etc.
8 We assume rational agents. This implies that 
agents will revise their current information and subsequently their decision as more 
information becomes available to them. We rule out “mimetic contagion” and assume 
that an investor’s decision does not contain any information to another investor (Topol, 
1991).
9 This enables us to explain the nature of creditor moral hazard based on the 
representative agent framework.
10  
  We assume competitive, risk-neutral lenders. The spread over the risk-free 
interest rate implies the default probability of country i, i δ , which is a function of the 
country’s fundamentals,  i Χ . Therefore, the ex-ante gross lending rate in country i, Ri, 
can be expressed as a function of the exogenous gross risk-free interest rate, R*, and the 










       ( 1 )  
 
  Even if a country defaults on its debt, some portion of its debt payments may be 
recovered. Whether and to what extent the recovery would take place depends upon the 
perceptions and decisions of lenders and borrowers. Lenders could recover their 
investment, among other things, if the country receives funds from the IMF, and if the 
borrowing country decides to use some portion of the financial assistance provided by the 
IMF to make recovery payments to the holders of its sovereign bonds in an attempt to 
prevent further decline in the country’s creditworthiness. The probability that the IMF  
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will provide financial support to country i,  i φ , is determined by the IMF. The proportion 
of publicly guaranteed bonds that will be recovered in the event of default, i ρ , is 
determined by the country i’s government.
11 We assume that the decisions of IMF 
regarding the supply of a program and the decisions of the borrowing government 
regarding the use of IMF funds for recovery payments are made independently from each 
other.  
  We assume that the risk-free interest rate is determined as follows:  
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As long as  1 〈 i iρ φ , only a portion of the loss due to default is recovered. The spread can 
be expressed as    
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Based on Equation (3), there is a negative relationship between the spread and the 
probability of IMF-support. As the probability of IMF-support increases, the spread on 
publicly guaranteed bonds declines, holding both the country’s fundamentals and the 
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The above discussion establishes a negative relationship between the probability of an 
IMF-support and spreads. This relationship may imply creditor moral hazard, because the 
IMF-support provides the program country with funds part of which may be used by the 
recipient county to make payments to the holders of its sovereign bonds.  
  At this point, we discuss the question of how investors would respond to IMF-
related news and what they would expect during the duration of an IMF program. With  
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respect to IMF-related news, we consider two types of news that are most relevant for 
moral hazard: announcement of program negotiations and program approval. We assume 
that investors interpret such news based on available information regarding the past and 
current economic performance of the relevant country. Once the start of program 
negotiations with a country is announced, it is important for investors to attach some 
probabilities to program approval. It is fairly rare that the IMF decides not to provide a 
program to a country at the end of negotiations. Therefore, once negotiations start, 
investors may believe that the country will receive IMF support with a very high 
probability. However, when negotiations start, it is assumed that investors do not know 
about the size of the program. This particular information, the amount of IMF support, is 
generally provided when a program is approved. The amount of IMF support is of 
relevance to investors who consider purchasing sovereign bonds of the program country, 
because larger IMF support would increase the ability of the government to service its 
debt payments. Investor expectations regarding the country’s economic performance 
during the IMF program are important as well. It could be argued that rational investors 
expect a slower economy in the program country during the implementation of an IMF 
program, given the evidence that GDP growth rates tend to decline during IMF program 
years (See Evrensel , 2002 and Prezeworski and Vreeland , 2000).  
  In addition to the program country’s own IMF-related news, it is important to 
consider IMF-related news in other prospective countries to control for sequential 
creditor moral hazard. Investors may use information contained in IMF programs 
provided to other emerging countries as an additional piece of information  to recalculate 
the probability of an IMF program in an emerging country. Suppose investors have 
certain views on relevant emerging countries’ debt instruments, including country i’s 
instruments (say, Indonesia), before the news about a possible IMF-program in country j 
(say, Thailand) appears. The news about country j receiving an IMF program may 
motivate investors to revise their stand on emerging markets in general and on country i’s 
economic situation in particular. Suppose, based on revised market views initiated by the 
IMF-related news in country j, investors conclude that country i would be the next 
country to receive an IMF program, which would motivate investors to buy country i’s 
sovereign bonds.    
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Based on these considerations, our spread estimations include IMF-related news 
that contain program negotiations and program announcements associated with the 
country in question and other related countries. We consider the following regression 
equation regarding the spread, suppressing time subscripts:  
i i j i i i D IMF IMF US X s ε φ ϕ β λ α + + + + + =  (5) 
 
where si represents the change in bond spreads in country i. Equation (5) suggests that, in 
addition to country i’s fundamentals (X), changes in spreads are affected by the spreads 
on U.S. high-yield corporate bonds (US), because such bonds may be related to emerging 
countries’ debt instruments.
12 With respect to IMF-related news, we use (0,1) dummy 
variables, capturing the program country’s own and other countries’ IMF-related news. 
First, we consider the effect of IMF-related news in country i on this country’s spread, 
which is captured byβ . In addition to dummies indicating the start of negotiations and 
approval of a program in country i, we include an uncertainty variable, which we  call 
“window”, that captures the uncertainty about the outcome of negotiations during the 
time period between the day after the announcement of negotiations and the day before 
the program announcement. Second, we consider the effects of country j’s IMF-related 
news on country i ’s spreads, which is captured byϕ . We use the same negotiation-, 
approval-, and window-dummies associated with IMF-related news in country j. Finally, 
a dummy variable program for program duration (D) is included to capture the changes in 
spreads during an IMF program.  
We now summarize the expected signs of the coefficients in Equation (5) in the 
presence of creditor moral hazard:   
 (i) The interpretation of the vector of coefficients that determine spreads depends upon 
the selected fundamentals. Because we use daily spread data, available daily variables 
that can be used as fundamentals are limited to exchange rates (E) and stock returns (SR). 














. The expected negative relationship between 
spreads and stock returns rests on the fact that stock returns contain information about the 
overall economic performance. Therefore, we expect that higher stock returns are 
associated with stronger overall economic performance, which should be associated with  
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lower spreads. However, it is also possible that the relationship between bond spreads 
and stock returns reflects asset substitution, in which case one expects a positive 
relationship. The relationship between spreads and the exchange rate (defined as the 
amount of domestic currency per U.S. dollar), is expected to be positive because, for 
example, a depreciating currency may be the consequence of expansionary monetary 
policy, which in turn may be associated with expansionary fiscal policy. Clearly, fiscal 
and monetary policies that produce higher price levels and lead to currency depreciation 
do not signal economic strength and should be associated with higher spreads.  
(ii) As Zhang (1999) suggests, in the presence of creditor moral hazard in bonds markets, 
the coefficient reflecting the relationship between US corporate bonds and emerging 
market bonds should be negative. Therefore, in the presence of moral hazard, it is 
expected that 0 < λ . If 0 > λ , this would indicate that emerging market and US corporate 
bonds have a complementary relationship.  
(iii) In the presence of moral hazard, the coefficients of IMF-related news dummies in 
countries  i and j are expected to be negative, given the countries’ fundamentals 
( 0 < β and 0 < ϕ ). The program duration dummy may be insignificant due to several 
reasons. Among them, even though previous studies expected a negative sign on the 
coefficient of the duration dummy,φ , in the presence of moral hazard, there is evidence 
that the overall economic performance weakens during an IMF program (Evrensel, 2002; 
Prezeworski and Vreeland, 2000). Additionally, considering the fact that programs last at 
least one year and portfolio flows are highly reversible, it is questionable whether creditor 
moral hazard would be present during the entire duration of an IMF program.   
 
4.  Empirical Analysis  
  We use daily bond spreads data of Indonesia and Korea.  The sample period is 
dictated by data availability. For Indonesia, it runs from 12/19/1996 through 2/27/2003, 
while for Korea it is from 5/17/1996 through 2/27/2003.  Countries’ spreads and US 
corporate bond spreads are expressed in percentage. For consistency, fundamentals such 
as exchange rate and stock market prices are also computed as percentage changes in 
these variables, using the log-differenced series, multiplied by 100. Data are obtained 
from DataStream.  
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Although data are available for Thailand, we do not include this country in our 
analysis as the dependent variable due to the (sequential) nature of our framework, 
because Thailand was the first country in the East Asia to experience a financial crisis. 
However, we include IMF-related announcements regarding Thailand in our estimations 
of the Indonesian and Korean bond spreads. Table 3 reports the dates of program 
negotiations and approvals, along with the duration of programs. 
  Table 4 summarizes the results of our empirical analysis. We use dummy 
variables regarding announcements of negotiations and program approval. These 
variables take a value of 1 at the day that negotiations begin (“negotiations”) and the day 
in which a program approval is announced for each country (“approval”), respectively. 
We include another dummy variable that captures the uncertainty about the outcome of 
negotiations. This variable is called “window” and takes a value of 1 during the time 
period from the day after the negotiations announcement until the day before the program 
announcement. Estimation also included lagged spreads to account for autocorrelation 
and a dummy variable to account for the prolonged volatility in spreads due to the 
turmoil during the financial crisis in Indonesia and Korea that lasted until the mid-1998s. 
These results are not reported in Table 4 for space considerations, but available upon 
request. 
    Table 4 contains the OLS and GARCH estimations of sovereign bond spreads in 
Indonesia and Korea. The fact that the majority of the previous studies employ OLS 
estimations of bond spreads and because we found significant ARCH effects in bond 
spreads (see the diagnostic tests in Table 4) motivated us to use this method to provide 
maximum likelihood GARCH(1,1) estimates of spreads as well. For Indonesia, the 
ARCH effects are found only at longer lags, suggesting long-term memory. These results 
are confirmed in Table 4, as the estimated ARCH coefficients for Indonesia are 
insignificant, the GARCH term is. For Korea, ARCH effects appear at much shorter lags, 
as confirmed by the significance of the ARCH term.  
  In the following, we report the statistically significant results of our empirical 
analysis, unless indicated otherwise.  
Impact of Fundamentals   
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In terms of spread determination in period t, we use current US corporate bond 
spreads and one-period lags of exchange rates and stock returns. The latter is important to 
remove the simultaneity bias. In all specifications, the coefficients on the US corporate 
bond spread variable in both Indonesia and Korea are significant and positive, indicating 
a complementary relationship between emerging and industrialized country high yield-
high risk debt instruments. The results verify those provided by Zhang (1999).  
As expected in the previous section, there is a positive relationship between 
spreads and exchange rates both in Indonesia and Korea, indicating that depreciations of 
the domestic currency increase sovereign bond spreads. This result is consistent both in 
OLS and GARCH specifications shown in Table 4.    
The relationship between spreads and stock market returns, however, is sensitive 
to the estimation method employed. As discussed in the theoretical section, the 
association between spreads and stock returns may be interpreted as an indication of 
overall economic performance or asset substitution. In Table 4, OLS estimates of the 
Indonesian spreads indicate a positive relationship between spreads and stock returns. For 
the Korean spreads, GARCH estimations imply a positive relationship between spreads 
and stock returns. Therefore, the results suggest the asset substitution interpretation of the 
bond spreads-stock returns relationship.  
Overall, our results demonstrate the ability of economic fundamentals, especially 
US corporate bond spreads and exchange rates, in explaining spreads during the sample 
period. 
Spreads and IMF announcements: Indonesia 
Thailand-related news, especially the announcement of program approval in 
Thailand, increases the Indonesian bond spreads. Additionally, the Indonesian spreads 
did not experience statistically significant changes during the Thai window. These results 
do not support the sequential moral hazard hypothesis. In the presence of sequential 
moral hazard, we would have observed a statistically significantly lower spreads in 
Indonesia due to IMF-related announcements in Thailand.  
When we consider Indonesia’s own IMF-related news, both OLS and GARCH 
estimations in Table 4 imply similar results. On the days of the negotiation and program 
approval announcements, Indonesian spreads declined significantly, which is consistent  
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with the moral hazard argument. The mean change in Indonesian spreads during the 
sample period was .0014 percent. The decline in spreads on the mentioned announcement 
days is quite above the mean. While the Indonesian spreads declined by .08 to .09 percent 
on the day of program negotiations, they declined by more than half a percent (.55) on the 
day of program approval.   
  During the Indonesian window, there is an increase in spreads, only when the 
GARCH model is employed, indicating uncertainty prior to the program approval. It 
seems that, even though investors may have been engaged in buying activity on the days 
of the negotiation and approval announcement, they may have been engaged in selling 
activity during the window.  
The results regarding the duration dummy in the mean equation indicates that, 
once the program starts, average changes in spreads are not statistically significant. 
However, the duration dummy has a statistically significant positive sign in the 
conditional variance equation, indicating an increase in the volatility of spreads during an 
IMF program. Therefore, we can conclude that, even though changes in spreads are not 
statistically significant during an IMF program, spreads exhibit higher volatility.
13 
The reported Q and Q
2 tests statistics for the Indonesian estimations indicate that 
the estimated GARCH(1,1) models do not suffer from serial correlation and accounts for 
time-varying volatility up to 10 lags.  
Spreads and IMF announcements: Korea 
The results regarding Korea are similar to those obtained for Indonesia. The 
majority of IMF-related announcements regarding Thailand and Indonesia seem to 
increase the Korean bond spreads, suggesting that IMF involvement in Thailand and 
Indonesia was associated with larger spreads in Korea. While the Korean spreads 
experienced no change during the Thai window, they increased during the Indonesian 
window. Because there is no evidence that other countries’ IMF-related announcements 
led to a decline in the Korean spreads, our results do not support the sequential moral 
hazard hypothesis for Korea. 
Regarding Korea’s own IMF-related announcements, the Korean spreads declined 
statistically significantly on the day of the announcements associated with Korean 
program negotiations and approval. Compared to the mean change in the Korean spreads  
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during the sample period (.0005 percent), the decline in spreads on the mentioned 
announcement days are quite large. While spreads declined by .6 to .9 percent on the day 
of program negotiations, they declined by .12 to .22 percent on the day of program 
approval. During its own window, both OLS and GARCH results indicate no change in 
spreads.   
The results regarding the significance of the duration dummy in the mean 
equation are sensitive to the specification used. While the change in spreads during the 
Korean program is not statistically significant in the GARCH model, OLS estimates 
indicate statistically significantly declining spreads during the program. However, the 
evidence is marginal at more than 10 percent. The statistical significance of the duration 
dummy in the conditional variance equation indicates higher volatility in the Korean 
spreads. Finally, the reported Q and Q
2 tests statistics indicate that the estimated 
GARCH(1,1) models do not suffer from serial correlation and accounts for all time-
varying volatility up to 10 lags.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
  We experimented with other models to check the sensitivity of our results to 
different specifications. First, we ran some dynamic models, which included up to 5-day 
lags of both announcement dummies (program negotiation and approval). The results of 
the dynamic models did not indicate any statistically significant patterns in spreads before 
IMF-related news. This result is consistent with Hayo and Kutan (2003) who found 
similar results for the impact of IMF-related news on stock returns. Therefore, these 
results are not reported.  
  Next, given the evidence that the window variables in Table seem to be 
insignificant in most cases, we experimented with a model that excludes the window 
variable, but instead adds a pre-announcement dummy associated with program 
negotiations and approval. In this model, the uncertainty is assumed to last only one day, 
the day before a particular announcement. This variable also captures the possibility that 
the official announcement could have been leaked the day before the announcement. 
These results are shown in Table 5.  
  The results regarding the impact of all fundamentals in both Indonesia and Korea 
are quite robust. There is no change in inferences, except in one case for Korea. In this  
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new specification, the impact of stock returns on spreads becomes insignificant. The 
program duration dummy in the mean equation is still insignificant in both countries. The 
Korean duration dummy, however, becomes significant in the conditional variance 
equation. 
  We summarize the rest of the results starting with Indonesia first. With respect to 
the sequential moral hazard hypothesis, our pre-announcement model produces similar 
results to that with windows. The one-day lagged Thai negotiations and program 
approval either increase the Indonesian spreads or lead to no change in them. As before, 
there is no evidence for the sequential moral hazard in Indonesia. 
When we consider Indonesia’s own IMF-related news, pre-announcement models 
indicate a decline on the days of the negotiation and approval announcements, which are 
consistent with our previous results using models with windows. In most of the pre-
announcement models, the change in spreads the day before the announcement of 
negotiations is significantly higher and may indicate some information leakage before the 
official announcement. The day before the program approval, spreads increase 
significantly as well, indicating uncertainty prior to program approval. However, the 
increase in spreads the day prior to the approval (.0464 percent) is more than ten times 
the decline in spreads on the day of the approval, still suggesting significant moral hazard 
effects.  
  Now, we turn to the results regarding Korea. With respect to the sequential moral 
hazard hypothesis, the negotiation and approval announcements in Thailand and 
Indonesia either do not lead to any changes in the Korean spreads or they lead to an 
increase in spreads. Only the one-day lagged Thai negotiations and the one-day lagged 
Indonesian approval decrease the Korean spreads in OLS specifications, which may be 
consistent with the sequential moral hazard hypothesis. However, the results of the pre-
announcement models do not suggest a strong sequential moral hazard effect in Korea. 
  With respect to the Korean news, the results of the pre-announcement models are 
consistent with those of window models. The Korean spreads decline on the days of 
negotiations and approval announcements in Korea. However, both OLS and GARCH 
results indicate a significant increase in the Korean spreads on the day before the 
negotiation announcement. Most pre-announcement results regarding program approval  
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indicate that the Korean spreads were higher the day before the announcements of 
negotiations and program approval.  
    Overall, our sensitivity tests indicate that most of our results in Table 4 remain 
robust in alternative model specifications.   
Discussion of Empirical Results  
    Compared to previous studies on creditor moral hazard in bond markets, our 
results demonstrate the advantage of using country-specific data and IMF-related 
dummies that do not only cover the program period, but also account for the changes in 
spreads due to IMF-related announcements. Considering the fact that previous studies use 
IMF-related dummies that last for the duration of IMF programs, it is plausible that they 
observe increasing spreads and conclude that creditor moral hazard in bond markets does 
not exist. However, our results suggest that countries’ own IMF-related news decreased 
spreads in Indonesia and Korea, especially when the GARCH models are used, which 
indicates the possibility of creditor moral hazard in sovereign bond markets.  
    With respect to investor behavior, the results indicate that investors appear to be 
rational and use all available information to make a decision. Additionally, as Sarno and 
Taylor (1999) suggest, they move fast in bonds and equity markets. Our results indicate 
that, given their risk awareness and expected reduction in risk and increase in returns 
through IMF support, they may have purchased Indonesian or Korean bonds on the days 
of local (own-country) IMF-related announcements.  
    The reason as to why the own window news does not indicate any statistically 
significant activity in the Korean bond market but indicates higher spreads in Indonesia 
(when GARCH models are used) can be explained by the characteristics of 
announcements regarding program negotiations and approval, as well as investors’ 
expectations regarding the relevant country’s fundamentals. One can argue that, once 
negotiations start, countries receive an IMF program with a probability close to 1, which 
may be enough information for some investors to buy these countries’ bonds. However, 
because of the fact that the size of the IMF program is not known and that there may be 
some publicized disagreements between the IMF and prospective program country during 
the negotiation period, we would observe a rather inactive window. On the day of the 
program approval, when the size of the program and program conditions are announced,  
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some investors who wanted to have this particular information may have bought the 
prospective program country’s bonds.  
    In the case of Indonesia, there was an additional element of risk: growing political 
and social instability. This, along with well-known close ties between the President and 
his family businesses in Indonesia probably made investors  nervous about the ownership 
and implementation of IMF programs, causing higher spreads during the window period. 
Program implementation was problematic in Indonesia. In addition to the pressures from 
the U.S. and the EU, regional powers such as Japan and Australia also intervened into the 
IMF-Indonesia relations. Korea, however, being one of the most robust emerging 
economies ever seems to have demonstrated more determination than Indonesia in the 
eyes of investors regarding the future implementation of their IMF program.  
     Our results indicate that investors seem to pay close attention to country-specific 
news. The extent of the decline in spreads on the day of the announcement regarding 
program negotiations and approval implies a clear pattern. As mentioned earlier, in 
Indonesia, the decline in spreads on the day of the announcement regarding program 
approval is five times larger than the decline in spreads on the day of the announcement 
regarding program negotiations. This indicates that, even though negotiations with the 
IMF generally lead to an IMF program, investors were not encouraged by the problematic 
IMF-Indonesia relations during the negotiation period until they finally know about the 
program approval and the size of the program.  
   In Korea, however, it was just the opposite. The decline in the Korean spreads on 
the day of program negotiations is about five times larger than the decline on the day of 
the announcement regarding program approval. The relative strength of approval-related 
news in Indonesia and negotiation-related news in Korea may lie in the fact that, while 
investor uncertainty regarding program approval in Indonesia was substantial, investors 
must have attached a greater probability to the program approval, once they heard the 
announcement regarding the start of negotiations in Korea.  
    Overall, the results show that investors are rational in the sense that they pay close 
attention to country-specific economic conditions and news. This result coupled with the 
fact that they react to news very quickly implies that there is creditor moral hazard in 
bond markets, its duration can be measured by days. There are two additional piece of  
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evidence we presented that further support why the duration of creditor moral hazard 
would be temporary. First, the observed decline in spreads in both Indonesia and Korea 
on the day of the negotiation announcement does not appear to persist and continue 
during the window period. Second, spreads do not appear to decline during an IMF 
program. Indeed, there is no significant change in the spreads during the program periods 
in both countries (except for Korea in OLS estimations). These empirical observations 
imply that creditor moral hazard, if it exists, can be best described as a short-run 
phenomenon, lasting only days.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks and Suggestions for further Research 
  The existing literature on creditor moral hazard in bond markets finds no evidence 
of moral hazard associated with IMF programs in emerging countries. Our motivation 
stems from the belief that the approach adopted by previous studies can be improved. We 
have introduced a unified framework for testing creditor moral hazard in sovereign bond 
markets. Our empirical analysis uses the spreads on Indonesian and Korean sovereign 
bonds. We find no strong evidence for the sequential moral hazard hypothesis. In other 
words, news related to other countries’ IMF announcements do not tend to decrease the 
relevant country’s spreads.  
  Similarly, we do not find any strong evidence that program duration is associated 
with creditor moral hazard. In most specifications, spreads do not change during the 
implementation of IMF programs both in Indonesia and Korea. We do, however, find 
evidence of declining spreads on the days of IMF-related announcements regarding 
program negotiations and approval, which may imply moral hazard. However, there are 
no significant declines in spreads following negotiation news during the window period 
prior to program approvals. Moreover, we observe significant increases in the spread the 
day before program approvals. These observations suggest that the duration of creditor 
moral hazard is quite short and may be measured only by days.  
  Regarding future research, more evidence from other episodes would be useful to 
make broader generalizations about investor behavior. In addition, the seemingly 
temporary nature of creditor moral hazard needs to be more investigated. We believe that 
the basic challenge to any creditor moral hazard study is the ability to distinguish  
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between usual investor behavior that simply reflects typical reactions to news and 
investor behavior that implies moral hazard. As Friedman (1998) says: “…. I regard that 
(moral hazard) as something of a libel. If someone offers you a gift, is it immoral for you 
to accept it? Similarly, it’s hard to blame private lenders for accepting the IMF’s implicit 
offer of insurance against risk.”  The challenge for future studies is therefore to develop 

















NOTES   
 
1 Cline (1995), Cantor and Packer (1996), Cline and Barnes (1997), and Eichengreen and Mody (1998) are 
among the papers on the determination of bond spreads. Spread is defined as the difference in the yields of 
a risky and risk-free instrument of similar maturity and currency denomination. Most studies use the yield 
on U.S. Treasury bill or note as the yield on the risk-free debt instrument.     
 
2 This result is verified in Eichengreen and Mody (1998) as well. 
 
3 First, the fact that spreads on emerging market bonds have declined since 1996 can be explained by a 
possible learning experience by emerging market borrowers and by the implementation of various 
stabilization programs,  especially in Latin America. In other words, declining spreads may be due to 
improving fundamentals. Second, because short-term interest rates in industrial countries declined as well, 
investors in these countries may have channeled funds toward emerging markets (Kamin and Kleist, 1999).  
 
4  While Eurobonds are short-term debt instruments, Brady bonds are long-term sovereign bonds that 
represent restructured sovereign commercial bank debt. During the early 1990s, the latter was virtually the 
only type of long-term sovereign bonds issued by emerging countries. Because the principle and interest on 
Brady bonds are partially collateralized, the countries that initially offered Brady bonds now issue 
uncollateralized debt with spreads that are frequently lower than the ones on outstanding Brady bonds. As 
Kamin and Kleist (1999) suggest, the disinclination to pay higher transaction costs associated with 
collateralization may have lowered the demand for such bonds. Still, Brady bonds are the single most-
traded emerging market debt instruments with transactions of $2.7 trillion in 1996. The sharp increase in 
the turnover of Brady bonds (from $1 trillion in 1993 to $2.7 trillion in 1996) relative to a modest increase 
in the stock of such bonds suggests that there has been a substantial increase in their liquidity. Furthermore, 
because Latin American issues represent a substantial proportion of outstanding Brady bonds, most 




5 The EMBI includes 21 emerging economies’ dollar denominated debt. Brady bonds have a weight of 91 
percent in EMBI (IMF, 1996).  
 
6 See Evrensel and Kutan (2004) for the framework of creditor moral hazard in emerging countries’ stock 
markets. 
 
7 Investors would know that IMF programs attempt to implement a stabilization program that suggests, 
among other things, the depreciation of the currency. Empirical studies suggest that, among other things, 
prescribed depreciation of domestic currencies has not been successfully implemented during IMF 
programs (Evrensel, 2002). In an attempt to avoid the currency risk, investors may focus on financial 
instruments of emerging markets denominated in foreign currencies. 
 
8 Noise traders who react in concert to non-fundamental signals are thought to influence equilibrium asset 
prices. Because price deviations from fundamentals created by changes in investor sentiment are 
unpredictable, noise traders introduce a systematic risk that is priced. See French, Schwert, and Stambaugh 
(1987), De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), Brauer (1993), Brown (1999), and Lee at al. 
(2002) for theoretical and empirical treatment of noise traders. 
 
9 Topol’s (1991) model assumes that an investor sets his bid or ask price according to an additive learning 
process. Investor adjusts his prices to his present value calculated from an incomplete information set. 
Additionally, to capture some information held by the other investors, he also adjusts his prices to average 
prices of his nearest buyers and sellers, which implies “mimetic contagion.”   
 
10  If agents have imperfect information and mimetic contagion exists, mean and variance of financial 
instruments’ prices are simultaneously determined, which implies that it is no longer possible to explain the 
price dynamics based on one agent’s statistical properties. The representative agent hypothesis becomes 
invalid (Topol, 1991).     
11 It is possible to further define the relationship between the default probability, country fundamentals, and 
IMF-support. One can assume, for example, that default probability is a function of the country’s 
fundamentals, and IMF programs influence these fundamentals. If IMF-support improved a country’s 
fundamentals, it would reduce the default probability, which would imply ( ) 0 / , < ∂ ∂ i i i i X φ φ δ . We 
assume away these relationships for two reasons. First, such relationships are essentially about program 
effectiveness, and not about creditor moral hazard. Second, the relationship between IMF-support and the 
country’s fundamentals (and therefore default probability) may not be a contemporaneous one. It is likely 
that there is a lag between the start of the IMF-support and its effects on the country’s economy.    
 
12 This spread implies the difference between the yield on a U.S. high-yield corporate bond and Treasury 
bill. 
 
13 We also attempted to include IMF-related news in the variance equation; however, the results were not 
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Table 2: Country-specific and regional representation in  
 the monthly EMBI (Dec 1990 – Oct 2001) 
 





1  0.00 31.40 
Brazil 
 
24.94 1.73  40.66 
Ecuador 
 
1.92 0.00 4.30 
Mexico 
 
31.73 12.20 70.62 
Nigeria 
 
1.36 0.00 2.76 
Panama 
 
1.10 0.00 3.53 
Venezuela 
 
13.81 6.26  27.65 
Latin 
 




2.43 0.00 6.48 
Philippines 
 
1.41 0.00 5.94 
Poland 
 
3.20 0.00 6.10 
Russia 
 
2.29 0.00 18.67 
Non-Latin 
 
10.66  0.00 




 the relevant countries’ percent share in the 
EMBI.  
2 Until April 1991, the EMBI consisted of Latin American debt.  
3 As of October 2001, non-Latin debt accounted for almost 33 





Table 3: Dates associated with IMF-related news and program duration 
1 
 
 Thailand   
 
Indonesia Korea 
Announcements associated with IMF programs 
2  
 
Start of negotiations 
 
08/05/97 10/08/97 11/21/97 
Program approval 
 






08/20/97 11/05/97 12/04/97 
Expiration date 
 
06/19/00 11/04/00 12/03/00 
 
1 The term “program” implies standby arrangements.  
2 Dates associated with IMF-related announcements are based on Lane and Phillips 
(2000).  
3  Annual Report of the IMF in 1998 and 1999 provides the duration information. 








Table 4: Estimations of sovereign bond spreads of Indonesia and Korea: models with window  
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12/19/96 – 2/27/03  5/17/96 – 2/27/03   
 
 
1 The following information on country-specific bonds is provided in the order of issue year, interest rate, 





Table 5: Estimations of sovereign bond spreads: models with pre-announcement effects 
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ARCH (35) test  
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